David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144 (2007)
It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, self- knowledge has also encountered its share of skeptics – philosophers who refuse to accord it any descriptive, let alone normative, distinction. In this paper, we argue that there is at least one _species_ of self-knowledge that is different from, and better than, other knowledge. It is a specific kind of knowledge of one’s concurrent phenomenal experiences. Call knowledge of one’s own phenomenal experiences _phenomenal knowledge_. Our claim is that some (though not all) phenomenal knowledge is different from, and better than, non-phenomenal knowledge. In other
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Citations of this work BETA
Nicholas Silins (2013). The Significance of High-Level Content. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
Declan Smithies (2013). On the Unreliability of Introspection. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1177-1186.
Declan Smithies (2013). The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.
Tim Bayne & Maja Spener (2010). Introspective Humility. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
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Frank Jackson (2006). The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press 52--64.
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