Primitive Entertainment

Abstract
Recent work on phenomenal consciousness has featured a number of debates on the existence and character of controversial types of phenomenology. Perhaps the best-­‐ known is a debate over the existence of a proprietary, irreducible cognitive phenomenology – a phenomenology proper to thought. Others concern the existence of irreducible agential or conative phenomenology, irreducible emotional phenomenology, and so on. In this paper, I argue that the act of entertaining a proposition also exhibits a distinctive phenomenology, a primitive phenomenology irreducible to any other. After clarifying the notion of primitive phenomenology (§1) and elaborating the thesis that entertaining exhibits one (§2), I present a prima facie case for the thesis (§3)
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