Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind

The Monist 91 (2):347-373 (2008)
We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
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DOI 10.5840/monist20089128
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Uriah Kriegel (2012). Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion. European Journal of Philosophy (3):420-442.

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