David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64 (2002)
Michael Tye has recently argued that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences is "one and the same as" (1) Poised (2) Abstract (3) Non-conceptual (4) Intentional Content (PANIC). Tye argues extensively that PANIC Theory accounts for differences in phenomenal character in representational terms. But another task of a theory of phenomenal consciousness is to account for the difference between those mental states that have phenomenal character at all and those that do not. By going through each of the four qualifiers of PANIC, we argue that PANIC Theory fails to account for this difference in genuinely representational terms. We suggest, furthermore, that the reasons it fails are likely to be endemic to all representational theories of phenomenal consciousness
|Keywords||Consciousness Content Experience Metaphysics Psychology Representation Tye, M|
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Citations of this work BETA
David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
Robert Schroer (2012). Representationalism and the Scene-Immediacy of Visual Experience: A Journey to the Fringe and Back. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):595 - 615.
Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
David Jehle & Uriah Kriegel (2006). An Argument Against Dispositionalist HOT. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476.
Uriah Kriegel (2002). Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness, and Higher-Order Monitoring. Dialogue 41 (3):517-540.
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