Social freedom and the test of moral responsibility

Ethics 103 (1):104-116 (1992)
The responsibility view of social freedom views obstacles as constraints on freedom if and only if there is an agent morally responsible for the obstacle's existence or nonsuppression. However, the test of moral responsibility offered by S.I. Benn and W.L. Weinstein is too narrow, W.E. Connolly's is too broad and D. Miller's is either trivial or wrong depending on whether a permissive or narrow interpretation is adopted. A plausible definition assigns moral responsibility for nonsuppression of an obstacle when a reasonable person could have been expected to suppress the obstacle.
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    M. Hyman (2009). Responsible Ads: A Workable Ideal. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 87 (2):199 - 210.
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