Social freedom and the test of moral responsibility

Ethics 103 (1):104-116 (1992)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The responsibility view of social freedom views obstacles as constraints on freedom if and only if there is an agent morally responsible for the obstacle's existence or nonsuppression. However, the test of moral responsibility offered by S.I. Benn and W.L. Weinstein is too narrow, W.E. Connolly's is too broad and D. Miller's is either trivial or wrong depending on whether a permissive or narrow interpretation is adopted. A plausible definition assigns moral responsibility for nonsuppression of an obstacle when a reasonable person could have been expected to suppress the obstacle.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
234 (#78,333)

6 months
3 (#439,232)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Responsible Ads: A Workable Ideal.M. Hyman - 2009 - Journal of Business Ethics 87 (2):199-210.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references