Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007)
Philosophical work on self-consciousness has mostly focused on the identification and articulation of specific epistemic and semantic peculiarities of self-consciousness, peculiarities which distinguish it from consciousness of things other than oneself. After drawing certain fundamental distinctions, and considering the conditions for the very possibility of self-consciousness, this article discusses the nature of those epistemic and semantic peculiarities.
Keywords mind
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David B. Martens (2010). First-Person Belief and Empirical Certainty. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):118-136.

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