Graduate studies at Western
European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
|Abstract||According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). In this paper, I argue that the old feeling theory is in reality only a pair of modifications removed from a highly plausible account of the nature of emotion that retains the essential connection between emotion and feeling. These modifications are, moreover, motivated by recent developments in work on phenomenal consciousness. The first development is the rising recognition of a phenomenal character proper to cognition—so-called cognitive phenomenology. The second is the gathering momentum behind various ‘connection principles’ that specify some connection that a given state must bear to phenomenally conscious states in order to qualify as mental. These developments make it possible to formulate a new feeling theory of emotion, which would overcome the two fatal drawbacks of the old feeling theory. According to the new feeling theory, an emotion is a mental state that bears the right connection to conscious experiences with the right phenomenal character (involving, among other elements, a cognitive phenomenology)|
|Keywords||emotion feeling cognitive phenomenology phenomenal intentionality|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Demian Whiting (2006). Standing Up for an Affective Account of Emotion. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
Demian Whiting (2011). The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
Irwin Goldstein (2002). Are Emotions Feelings? A Further Look at Hedonic Theories of Emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
Jennifer Wilkinson (1998). Feeling an Emotion. South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):62-74.
Joel J. Kupperman (1995). An Anti-Essentialist View of the Emotions. Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):341-351.
Rainer Reisenzein (forthcoming). What is an Emotion in the Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion? In F. Paglieri, M. Tummolini, F. Falcone & M. Miceli (eds.), The goals of cognition: Essays in honor of Cristiano Castelfranchi. College Publications.
Antonio R. Damasio (2001). Reflections on the Neurobiology of Emotion and Feeling. In The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rainer Reisenzein (2009). Emotions as Metarepresentational States of Mind: Naturalizing the Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion. Cognitive Systems Research 10:6-20.
Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson (forthcoming). The Feeling Body: Towards an Enactive Approach to Emotion. In W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.), Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). The Feeling of Being. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):43-60.
Robert C. Solomon (2004). Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings: Emotions as Engagements with the World. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
Geoffrey C. Madell & Aaron Ridley (1997). Emotion and Feeling. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):147-176.
Eva-Maria Engelen & Birgitt Röttger-Rössler (2012). Current Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Debates on Empathy. Emotion Review 4 (1):3-8.
Philip J. Koch (1987). Bodily Feeling in Emotion. Dialogue 26 (01):59-75.
Added to index2011-08-22
Total downloads132 ( #4,481 of 740,918 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #10,209 of 740,918 )
How can I increase my downloads?