The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects

Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95 (2008)
Abstract
The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
Keywords Intentionality  Intentional objects  Adverbialism  Ontological commitment
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1986). Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.
Hartry Field (1977). Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (July):379-409.

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Citations of this work BETA
Uriah Kriegel (2011). The Veil of Abstracta. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.
Jonathan Cohen (2010). Perception and Computation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
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