Two Notions of Mental Representation

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge (forthcoming)
Abstract The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
Keywords mental representation  tracking  teleosemantics  phenomenal intentionality
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,653
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (2004). Notes Toward a Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation. In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Elsevier.
    Robert van Gulick (1982). Mental Representation: A Functionalist View. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):3-20.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2012-01-24

    Total downloads

    154 ( #2,393 of 548,984 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    8 ( #8,781 of 548,984 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums