Graduate studies at Western
In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge (2013)
|Abstract||The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.|
|Keywords||mental representation tracking teleosemantics phenomenal intentionality|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics. Dissertation, Princeton University
Angela Mendelovici (2013). Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Personal-Level Representation. Protosociology 28:77-114.
Dan Ryder (2004). SINBaD Neurosemantics: A Theory of Mental Representation. Mind and Language 19 (2):211-240.
Hugh Clapin (ed.) (2002). Philosophy of Mental Representation. Oxford University Press.
Stuart Silvers (ed.) (1989). Representation: Readings In The Philosophy Of Mental Representation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (2004). Notes Toward a Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation. In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Elsevier.
Timothy L. Hubbard (2007). What is Mental Representation? And How Does It Relate to Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):37-61.
Andrew R. Bailey (2007). Representation and a Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):62-76.
Robert van Gulick (1982). Mental Representation: A Functionalist View. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):3-20.
Eduard Marbach (1993). Mental Representation and Consciousness: Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference. Kluwer.
Melinda Hogan (1994). What is Wrong with an Atomistic Account of Mental Representation. Synthese 100 (2):307-27.
William F. Brewer (2001). Models in Science and Mental Models in Scientists and Nonscientists. Mind and Society 2 (2):33-48.
Added to index2012-01-24
Total downloads155 ( #3,157 of 739,332 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #13,453 of 739,332 )
How can I increase my downloads?