David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267 (2011)
Of all the problems attending the sense-datum theory, arguably the deepest is that it draws a veil of appearances over the external world. Today, the sense-datum theory is widely regarded as an overreaction to the problem of hallucination. Instead of accounting for hallucination in terms of intentional relations to sense data, it is often thought that we should account for it in terms of intentional relations to properties. In this paper, however, I argue that in the versions that might address the problem of hallucination, this newer account is guilty of a vice similar to sense-datum theory’s: it draws a veil of abtracta over the concrete world.
|Keywords||hallucination sense data universals|
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
David K. Lewis (1986/2001). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Michael Huemer (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
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