David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 175 (2):193--218 (2010)
Over the last four decades arguments for and against the claim that creative hypothesis formation is based on Darwinian ‘blind’ variation have been put forward. This paper offers a new and systematic route through this long-lasting debate. It distinguishes between undirected, random, and unjustified variation, to prevent widespread confusions regarding the meaning of undirected variation. These misunderstandings concern Lamarckism, equiprobability, developmental constraints, and creative hypothesis formation. The paper then introduces and develops the standard critique that creative hypothesis formation is guided rather than blind, integrating developments from contemporary research on creativity. On that basis, I discuss three compatibility arguments that have been used to answer the critique. These arguments do not deny guided variation but insist that an important analogy exists nonetheless. These compatibility arguments all fail, even though they do so for different reasons: trivialisation, conceptual confusion, and lack of evidence respectively. Revisiting the debate in this manner not only allows us to see where exactly a ‘Darwinian’ account of creative hypothesis formation goes wrong, but also to see that the debate is not about factual issues, but about the interpretation of these factual issues in Darwinian terms.
|Keywords||Darwinism blind variation creativity evolutionary epistemology Campbell Popper Simonton|
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References found in this work BETA
Karl R. Popper (1972). Objective Knowledge. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
Herbert A. Simon (1969). The Sciences of the Artificial. [Cambridge, M.I.T. Press.
David L. Hull (1988). Science as a Process an Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. University of Chicago Press.
Paul Thagard (1988). Computational Philosophy of Science. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Citations of this work BETA
Chris Buskes (2013). Darwinism Extended: A Survey of How the Idea of Cultural Evolution Evolved. Philosophia 41 (3):661-691.
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