David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):187-212 (2007)
Libertarians, like Thomas Reid, hold that motives do not causally necessitate our choices. The problem that arises is to explain how the agent decides to act according to one motive and not the other. In light of some objections brought up by Leibniz and Edwards but also by contemporary compatibilists such as Haji and Goetz, I examine Thomas Reid's possible answer to this problem. I argue that to explain our choices Reid would appeal not only to motives and character traits but also to the amount of effort needed to choose what is best. I also address Reid's criticism of the implicit presupposition of the Principle of Suffi cient Reason. My aim is therefore to explore, clarify and defend Reid's account of agency in choicemaking.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Stewart C. Goetz (1998). Failed Solutions to a Standard Libertarian Problem. Philosophical Studies 90 (3):237-244.
James A. Harris (2005). Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (1999). Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck. Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (02):274-.
Timothy O'Connor (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Claire Landiss (forthcoming). A Reidian Reading of Shakespeare's Macbeth: Exploring the Moral Faculty Through Philosophy and Drama. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):145-166.
Similar books and articles
Esther R. Kroeker (2009). Reid on Natural Signs, Taste and Moral Perception. In Sabine Roeser (ed.), Reid on Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
Nicholas Wolterstorff (2001). Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
Todd Buras (2002). The Problem with Reid's Direct Realism. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):457-477.
Thomas Reid (1863/1975). Thomas Reid's Inquiry and Essays. Bobbs-Merrill.
Amit Hagar (2002). Thomas Reid and Non-Euclidean Geometry. Reid Studies 5 (2):54-64.
Rebecca Copenhaver (2006). Thomas Reid's Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness and Intentionality. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):279-289.
Xiangdong Xu (2011). Thomas Reid on Active Power and Free Agency. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):369-389.
Terence Cuneo (2011). A Puzzle Regarding Reid's Theory of Motives. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (5):963-981.
Added to index2010-07-11
Total downloads17 ( #98,934 of 1,102,845 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #120,475 of 1,102,845 )
How can I increase my downloads?