Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 106 (3):197 - 225 (2001)
|Abstract||Identity claims often look nonsensical because they apparently declaredistinct things to be identical. I argue that this appearance is notjust an artefact of grammar. We should be fictionalists about such claims,seeing them against the background of speakers' pretense that their wordssecure reference to a plurality of objects that are then declared to beidentical from within the pretense. I argue that it is the resultinginterpretative tension – arising from the fact that two things cannever be identical – that allows us to understand the real point ofsuch statements. This view also offers a new solution to Fege's puzzleof the informativeness of identity statements.|
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