Mental causation as multiple causation

Philosophical Studies 139 (1):125-143 (2008)
The paper argues that mental causation can be explained from the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation together with relatively weak assumptions about the metaphysics of mind. If a physical event counterfactually depends on an earlier physical event, it also counterfactually depends on, and hence is caused by, a mental event that correlates with (or supervenes on) this earlier physical event, provided that this correlation (or supervenience) is sufficiently modally robust. This account of mental causation is consistent with the overdetermination of physical events by mental events and other physical events, but does not entail it.
Keywords Mental causation  Counterfactual theories of causation  Overdetermination  Psycho-physical correlation  Supervenience
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DOI 10.2307/40208895
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (2000). Causation as Influence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

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