Rationality and epistemic paradox

Synthese 94 (3):377 - 408 (1993)
This paper provides a new solution to the epistemic paradox of belief-instability, a problem of rational choice which has recently received considerable attention (versions of the problem have been discussed by — among others — Tyler Burge, Earl Conee, and Roy Sorensen). The problem involves an ideally rational agent who has good reason to believe the truth of something of the form:[Ap] p if and only if it is not the case that I accept or believe p.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF01064486
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,201
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Blindspots. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1979). Prisoners' Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem. Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (3):235-240.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Earl Conee (1994). Against an Epistemic Dilemma. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):475 – 481.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

55 ( #86,814 of 1,940,976 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

22 ( #25,515 of 1,940,976 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.