Science, Technology and Experiments; The Natural versus the Artificial

Hacking has maintained that in experiments phenomena are created, not discovered, and that scientific entities are tools for doing. These claims undermine the distinction between the natural and the artificial: phenomena and scientific entities become artifacts. Hacking's view raises the question whether the distinction between the natural and the artificial has to be given up. The paper argues 1) that phenomena are created, but in a sense that does not undermine the distinction between the natural and the artificial, 2) that scientific entities are used as tools instead of being tools, and 3) that Hacking's view on experiments may be reconciled with the traditional view provided the concept of nature be reinterpreted.
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DOI 10.2307/192955
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Kristian Camilleri & Maximilian Schlosshauer (2015). Niels Bohr as Philosopher of Experiment: Does Decoherence Theory Challenge Bohr׳s Doctrine of Classical Concepts? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 49:73-83.
Mauricio Suárez (2012). The Ample Modelling Mind. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):213-217.

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