Concrete consciousness: A Sartrean critique of functionalist accounts of mind

Sartre Studies International 12 (2):44-60 (2006)
Abstract
Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be included in ongoing debates over the nature of consciousness. First, I look at some of the basic claims motivating functionalist accounts of mind. Next, I look at Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness and discuss how this notion challenges functionalist accounts of mentality. I conclude by suggesting that Sartre's rendering of pre-reflective consciousness remains overly cognitivist. I show how this notion can be deepened to include the sensory-motor capacities of the situated body—resulting in a pre-reflective bodily self-awareness—and how this deepened formulation offers a further challenge to functionalist accounts of mind.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,105
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Richard Fincham (2007). Hölderlin and Novalis. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 10:183-188.
Christopher S. Hill (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
Gregory Harding (1991). Color and the Mind-Body Problem. Review of Metaphysics 45 (2):289-307.
Todd C. Moody (1986). Distinguishing Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (December):289-95.
M. M. Agrawal (1988). Sartre on Pre-Reflective Consciousness. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research (September-December) 121 (September-December):121-127.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

14 ( #114,504 of 1,101,740 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #292,019 of 1,101,740 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.