David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173 (2012)
Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view receives robust support from several strands of empirical research.
|Keywords||Phenomenology Philosophy of mind Social cognition Empathy Distributed cognition Extended mind|
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2009). Why the Mind is Still in the Head. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge. 78--95.
Anthony P. Atkinson, Mary L. Tunstall & Winand H. Dittrich (2007). Evidence for Distinct Contributions of Form and Motion Information to the Recognition of Emotions From Body Gestures. Cognition 104 (1):59-72.
Andy Clark (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Stephen Langfur (2013). The You-I Event: On the Genesis of Self-Awareness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):769-790.
Tom Froese & Thomas Fuchs (2012). The Extended Body: A Case Study in the Neurophenomenology of Social Interaction. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):205-235.
Søren Overgaard & Joel Krueger (2013). Social Perception and “Spectator Theories” of Other Minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):434 - 435.
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