Seeing mind in action

Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view receives robust support from several strands of empirical research.
Keywords Phenomenology  Philosophy of mind  Social cognition  Empathy  Distributed cognition  Extended mind
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9226-y
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PhilPapers Archive Joel Krueger, Seeing mind in action
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