David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173 (2012)
Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view receives robust support from several strands of empirical research.
|Keywords||Phenomenology Philosophy of mind Social cognition Empathy Distributed cognition Extended mind|
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References found in this work BETA
Andy Clark (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press.
Alva Noë (2005). Action in Perception. The MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Vivian Bohl & Nivedita Gangopadhyay (2014). Theory of Mind and the Unobservability of Other Minds. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):203-222.
Shaun Gallagher & Somogy Varga (2014). Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions. Topoi 33 (1):185-199.
Giovanna Colombetti & Tom Roberts (2015). Extending the Extended Mind: The Case for Extended Affectivity. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1243-1263.
Mitchell Herschbach (2015). Direct Social Perception and Dual Process Theories of Mindreading. Consciousness and Cognition 36:483-497.
Colin J. Palmer, Anil K. Seth & Jakob Hohwy (2015). The Felt Presence of Other Minds: Predictive Processing, Counterfactual Predictions, and Mentalising in Autism. Consciousness and Cognition 36:376-389.
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