David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational justification in this domain). Until the mid-nineties, the latter debate – which sometimes goes under the name of the “mindreading” debate – was characterized by a fairly clear-cut opposition between two theoretical outlooks: “theory-theory” (TT) and “simulation theory” (ST). Theory-theorists typically argued that we attribute mental states to others on the basis of a “theory of mind” that is either constructed in early infancy and subsequently revised and modified (Gopnik 1996), or else is the result of maturation of innate mindreading “modules” (Baron-Cohen 1995). Simulation theorists, on the other hand, held that it is by creating simulated “pretend states” in ourselves that we understand the mental states of others (Goldman 1995; Gordon 1995). Recently, a number of theorists have suggested another explanation of our understanding of others as having mental states – an explanation that, at least prima facie, seems very different from the TT and ST paradigms. Drawing on the approach to other minds defended by classical phenomenologists such as Max Scheler (1954: 238-64) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002: 214-16, 403-25), recent participants in the mindreading debate have maintained that we often see, or perceive in some other modality, that another is in the grip of a particular emotion, say. In other words, the processes involved in our detection of others’ emotions and other mental states are often perceptual processes that are not supplemented by any extra-perceptual cognitive mechanisms (e.g., inferential processes, conscious simulation routines, or the like)..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Joel Krueger (2012). Seeing Mind in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
Shannon Spaulding (2015). On Direct Social Perception. Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
Shaun Gallagher & Somogy Varga (2014). Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions. Topoi 33 (1):185-199.
John Michael & Leon De Bruin (2015). How Direct is Social Perception? Consciousness and Cognition 36:373-375.
Mitchell Herschbach (2015). Direct Social Perception and Dual Process Theories of Mindreading. Consciousness and Cognition 36:483-497.
Similar books and articles
Mitchell Herschbach (2012). Mirroring Versus Simulation: On the Representational Function of Simulation. Synthese 189 (3):483-513.
William E. S. McNeill (2012). Embodiment and the Perceptual Hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):569 - 591.
A. Goldman (2006/2008). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.
Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols (2004). Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology. In R. Stanton, M. Ezcurdia & C. Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press 297-339.
Annika Wallin (2011). Is Egocentric Bias Evidence for Simulation Theory? Synthese 178 (3):503-514.
Josef Perner & Johannes L. Brandl (2009). Simulation À la Goldman: Pretend and Collapse. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):435 - 446.
Josef Perner & Johannes L. Brandl (2009). Review: Simulation À la Goldman: Pretend and Collapse. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):435 - 446.
Justin C. Fisher (2006). Does Simulation Theory Really Involve Simulation? Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):417 – 432.
Frédérique de Vignemont (2009). Drawing the Boundary Between Low-Level and High-Level Mindreading. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):457 - 466.
Frédérique De Vignemont (2009). Review: Drawing the Boundary Between Low-Level and High-Level Mindreading. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):457 - 466.
Matteo Mameli & Lisa Bortolotti (2006). Animal Rights, Animal Minds, and Human Mindreading. Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (2):84-89.
Added to index2011-02-04
Total downloads279 ( #5,805 of 1,777,465 )
Recent downloads (6 months)34 ( #23,037 of 1,777,465 )
How can I increase my downloads?