Graduate studies at Western
Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):491-504 (1998)
|Abstract||Ontologically, brains are more basic than mental representations. Epistemologically, mental representations are more basic than brains and, indeed, all other non-mental entities: it is, and must be, on the basis of mental representations that we know anything about non-mental entities. Since, consequently, mental representations are epistemically more fundamental than brains, the former cannot possibly be explained in terms of the latter, notwithstanding that the latter are ontologically more fundamental than the former. There is thus an explanatory gap, notwithstanding the presumptive truth of materialism.|
|Keywords||Epistemology Mental Metaphysics Proof Reality Sensation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Frank Jackson (1976). The Existence of Mental Objects. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):33-40.
Harold Langsam (1995). Why Pains Are Mental Objects. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):303-13.
Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
Michael Tye (1989). The Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Carlo Cellucci (2008). Why Proof? What is a Proof? In Giovanna Corsi & Rossella Lupacchini (eds.), Deduction, Computation, Experiment. Exploring the Effectiveness of Proof, pp. 1-27. Springer.
J. N. Wright (1944). Mental Activity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 44:107-126.
William E. Seager (1981). The Anomalousness of the Mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):389-401.
Tim Crane (1997). Galen Strawson on Mental Reality. Ratio 10 (1):82-90.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #95,639 of 739,395 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,395 )
How can I increase my downloads?