David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):491-504 (1998)
Ontologically, brains are more basic than mental representations. Epistemologically, mental representations are more basic than brains and, indeed, all other non-mental entities: it is, and must be, on the basis of mental representations that we know anything about non-mental entities. Since, consequently, mental representations are epistemically more fundamental than brains, the former cannot possibly be explained in terms of the latter, notwithstanding that the latter are ontologically more fundamental than the former. There is thus an explanatory gap, notwithstanding the presumptive truth of materialism.
|Keywords||Epistemology Mental Metaphysics Proof Reality Sensation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Frank Jackson (1976). The Existence of Mental Objects. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):33-40.
William E. Seager (1981). The Anomalousness of the Mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):389-401.
J. N. Wright (1944). Mental Activity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 44:107-126.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. 75-96.
Michael Tye (1989). The Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
Harold Langsam (1995). Why Pains Are Mental Objects. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):303-13.
Tim Crane (1997). Galen Strawson on Mental Reality. Ratio 10 (1):82-90.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #105,148 of 1,692,924 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #114,250 of 1,692,924 )
How can I increase my downloads?