David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Pragmatics 42 (8):2314-2346 (2010)
On the basis of arguments put forth by (Kripke, 1977a) and (Kripke, 1980), it is widely held that one can sometimes rationally accept propositions of the form "P and not-P" and also that there are necessary a posteriori truths. We will find that Kripke's arguments for these views appear probative only so long as one fails to distinguish between semantics and presemantics—between the literal meanings of sentences, on the one hand, and the information on the basis of which one identifies those literal meanings, on the other. This same failure, it will be argued, underlies the popular thesis that intersubstituting co-referring terms sometimes turns true sentences into false ones and vice versa. Though seemingly plausible, this thesis has a number of counterintuitive consequences, among them that the occurrence of “snow” in “it is true that snow is white” doesn’t refer to snow. An understanding of the distinction between semantics and presemantics suggests a way to develop a semantic system that doesn’t have these consequences and that, moreover, reconciles our intuitions concerning cognitive content with some powerfully argued theses of contemporary philosophy of language. Some of this paper's main contentions are anticipated by Andrzej Boguslawski in his 1994 paper “Sentential Complementation and Truth.”
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John-Michael Kuczynski (2007). Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A Defense of Content-Internalism and Semantic Externalism. John Benjamins & Co.
Kathrin Glüer & Peter Pagin (2008). Relational Modality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (3):307-322.
Stephen K. McLeod (2008). Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism. Philosophy 83 (324):179-191.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2008). A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis. Metaphysica 9 (2):57-68.
Matthew McGrath (1997). Weak Deflationism. Mind 106 (421):69-98.
James R. Beebe, Prosentential Theory of Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Eiko Isoda (1997). Kripke Bundle Semantics and C-Set Semantics. Studia Logica 58 (3):395-401.
Heimir Geirsson (1994). Necessity, Apriority, and True Identity Statements. Erkenntnis 40 (2):227 - 242.
Margaret Atherton (2003). How Berkeley Can Maintain That Snow is White. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):101–113.
D. Patterson (2003). What is a Correspondence Theory of Truth? Synthese 137 (3):421 - 444.
Added to index2010-12-26
Total downloads161 ( #7,383 of 1,696,808 )
Recent downloads (6 months)18 ( #32,143 of 1,696,808 )
How can I increase my downloads?