A realist partner for Linda: confirming a theoretical hypothesis more than its observational sub-hypothesis
Synthese 184 (1):63-71 (2012)
|Abstract||It is argued that the conjunction effect has a disjunctive analog of strong interest for the realism–antirealism debate. It is possible that a proper theory is more confirmed than its (more probable) observational sub-theory and hence than the latter’s disjunctive equivalent, i.e., the disjunction of all proper theories that are empirically equivalent to the given one. This is illustrated by a toy model|
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