Inductive Analogy in Carnapian Spirit

In this paper it is shown that there is a natural way of dealing with analogy by similarity in inductive systems by extending intuitive ways of introduction of systems without analogy. This procedure leads to Carnap-like systems, with zero probability for contingent generalizations, satisfying a general principle of so-called virtual analogy. This new principle is different from, but compatible with, Carnap's principle. It will be shown that the latter principle is satisfied, and should only be satisfied, if the underlying distance function is such that all predicates have the same "predicate-environment". Finally, the claim that the new systems have the property of order indifference only with respect to the past will be defended.
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