David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):121 – 126 (1993)
Abstract Fodor defines epistemic boundedness as a condition wherein there are epistemi?cally significant constraints on the beliefs that a mind is capable of entertaining. He discusses a type of (epistemic) boundedness wherein a hypothesis cannot be entertained because it is inexpressible in terms of the mind's stock of concepts. In addition to this semantic boundedness, I describe a number of different sources of boundedness having to do with syntactic, abductive, and implementational limitations. I also discuss the similarities and differences between individual and social limitations on our epistemic possibilities
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References found in this work BETA
Margaret Gilbert (1987). Modelling Collective Belief. Synthese 73 (1):185-204.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
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