David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 59 (3):492-497 (1992)
According to a certain type of instrumentalist, we may have good reasons for accepting scientific theories, but never for believing more than their empirical consequences. Horwich (1991) considers several attempts to capture a difference between acceptance and belief, and claims that none of them succeed. He concludes that instrumentalism has not been shown to be a coherent position. However, in the course of his discussion, Horwich himself deploys a conceptual apparatus which is sufficient for formulating the instrumentalist doctrine in a coherent manner. The worst accusation that can be laid against instrumentalists is that they have violated common linguistic usage
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Mark Sprevak (forthcoming). Realism and Instrumentalism. In H. Pashler (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE Publications
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2011). The Instrumentalist's New Clothes. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1200-1211.
Elijah Millgram (1995). Was Hume a Humean? Hume Studies 21 (1):75-94.
Dale E. Miller (2004). On Millgram on Mill. Utilitas 16 (1):96-108.
James Hawthorne (1996). Mathematical Instrumentalism Meets the Conjunction Objection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):363-397.
Elijah Millgram (1996). Williams' Argument Against External Reasons. Noûs 30 (2):197-220.
Paul Horwich (1991). On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment. Philosophy of Science 58 (1):1-14.
Robin Findlay Hendry (2001). Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S25-.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #278,864 of 1,938,536 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #449,299 of 1,938,536 )
How can I increase my downloads?