Studies in Scientific Realism

Oxford University Press (1998)
Abstract
This book offers a superbly clear analysis of the standard arguments for and against scientific realism. In surveying claims on both sides of the debate, Kukla organizes them in ways that expose unnoticed connections. He identifies broad patterns of error, reconciles seemingly incompatible positions, and discovers unoccupied positions with the potential to influence further debate. Kukla's overall assessment is that neither the realists nor the antirealists may claim a decisive victory.
Keywords Realism  Science Philosophy  Science Methodology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $10.65 used (92% off)   $43.44 new (66% off)   $74.33 direct from Amazon (41% off)    Amazon page
Call number Q175.32.R42.K85 1998
ISBN(s) 0195118650   9780195118650
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,084
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Timothy D. Lyons (2009). Non-Competitor Conditions in the Scientific Realism Debate. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (1):65-84.
James Ladyman (2012). Science, Metaphysics and Method. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):31-51.

View all 14 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

28 ( #66,464 of 1,101,888 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #68,243 of 1,101,888 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.