David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 156 (2):205-229 (2007)
The central claim of this paper is that what it is like to see green or any other perceptible property is just the perceptual mode of presentation of that property. Perceptual modes of presentation are important because they help resolve a tension in current work on consciousness. Philosophers are pulled by three mutually inconsistent theses: representational externalism, representationalism, and phenomenal internalism. I throw my hat in with defenders of the first two: the externalist representationalists. We are faced with the problem of explaining away intuitions that favor phenomenal internalism. Perceptual modes of presentation account for what it is like to see properties in a way that accommodates those intuitions without vindicating phenomenal internalism itself. Perceptual MoPs therefore provide a new way of being an externalist representationalist.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Language Metaphysics Epistemology Logic Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Citations of this work BETA
M. Montague (2010). Recent Work on Intentionality. Analysis 70 (4):765-782.
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