David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 177 (1):1 - 17 (2010)
Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). I argue using Keynes' and Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you're unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences based on the indifference principle. Later you learn how the game works and discover that the odds dictate you assign the very same credences. Examples like this show that if you initially have no reason to believe H, then intuitively E can give you reason to believe H even though Pr(H|E) ≤ Pr(H). I show that without the principle, the objections to dogmatism fail
|Keywords||Epistemology Bayesianism Confirmation Evidence Foundationalism Dogmatism|
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References found in this work BETA
Christopher Peacocke (2004). The Realm of Reason. Oxford University Press.
James Pryor (2000). The Skeptic and the Dogmatist. Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Citations of this work BETA
Luca Moretti (2015). In Defence of Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.
Luca Moretti (2014). Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility. Erkenntnis 79 (2):381-403.
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