David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The invariance under interventions –account of causal explanation imposes a modularity constraint on causal systems: a local intervention on a part of the system should not change other causal relations in that system. This constraint has generated criticism against the account, since many ordinary causal systems seem to break this condition. This paper answers to this criticism by noting that explanatory models are always models of specific causal structures, not causal systems as a whole, and that models of causal structures can have different modularity properties which determine what can and what cannot be explained with the model.
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Peter Menzies (2012). The Causal Structure of Mechanisms. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):796-805.
Peter Menzies (2012). The Causal Structure of Mechanisms. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (4):796-805.
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