David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):659–680 (2005)
Might there be knowledge of non-instrumental values? Arguments are give for two principal claims. One is that if there is such knowledge, it typically will have features that do not entirely match those of other kinds of knowledge. It will have a closer relation to the kind of person one is or becomes, and in the way it combines features of knowing-how with knowing-that. There also are problems of indeterminacy of non-instrumental value which are not commonly found in other things that we can know about. The second claim is that there is a strong prima-facie case for holding that there is such knowledge, and that the usual arguments against this are all faulty
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1958). Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
Claire Armon-Jones (1991). Varieties of Affect. University of Toronto Press.
A. J. Ayer (1956). The Problem of Knowledge. Harmondsworth.
Barbara L. Fredrickson (2000). Extracting Meaning From Past Affective Experiences: The Importance of Peaks, Ends, and Specific Emotions. Cognition and Emotion 14 (4):577-606.
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