Virtue in virtue ethics

Journal of Ethics 13 (2-3):243 - 255 (2009)
This paper represents two polemics. One is against suggestions (made by Harman and others) that recent psychological research counts against any claim that there is such a thing as genuine virtue (Cf. Harman, in: Byrne, Stalnaker, Wedgwood (eds.) Fact and value, pp 117–127, 2001 ). The other is against the view that virtue ethics should be seen as competing against such theories as Kantian ethics or consequentialism, particularly in the specification of decision procedures.
Keywords Character  Lapse  Psychological  Situation  Traits  Virtue
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DOI 10.2307/40345403
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References found in this work BETA
Phillipa Foot (1997). Virtues and Vices. In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the Good Life. OUP Usa
Philippa Foot (1997). Virtues and Vices. In Daniel Statman (ed.), Noûs. Georgetown University Press 163--177.

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