David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):157-158 (1999)
For a theory of phenomenal consciousness, the real issue is not that between vehicle and process, but between naturalistic and deconstructive theories. Most current naturalistic theories combine a hypothesis about the neural correlate of consciousness with a subsequent naturalistic proposal about how to close the explanatory gap. Deconstructive theories use theses about the neural correlate of consciousness only to motivate and support their claim that the “hard problem” of consciousness is a pseudo-problem which is not to be solved, but rather dissolved on non-naturalistic grounds. O'Brien & Opie present a hypothesis concerning the neural correlate of consciousness, but no genuine strategy to close the explanatory gap. Their theory can, however, contribute to the success of a deconstructive theory of PC.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
A. H. C. van der Heijden, P. T. W. Hudson & A. G. Kurvink (1997). On Widening the Explanatory Gap. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):157-158.
Neil Campbell Manson (2002). Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap. Inquiry 45 (4):521-540.
Uriah Kriegel (2011). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Klaus Oberauer (2001). The Explanatory Gap is Still There. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):996-997.
Natika Newton (1999). Arguing About Consciousness: A Blind Alley and a Red Herring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):162-163.
David J. Chalmers (2007). Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Uriah Kriegel (2007). A Cross-Order Integration Hypothesis for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. Consciousness & Cognition 16 (4):897-912.
M. Moskopp Kurthen (1999). Conscious Behavior Explained. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):155-158.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #179,168 of 1,102,044 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #128,871 of 1,102,044 )
How can I increase my downloads?