David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Utilitas 24 (01):41-62 (2012)
This article argues that the decision problem in the original position should be characterized as a decision problem under uncertainty even when it is assumed that the denizens of the original position know that they have an equal chance of ending up in any given individual’s place. It supports this claim by arguing that (a) the continuity axiom of decision theory does not hold between all of the outcomes the denizens of the original position face and that (b) neither us nor the denizens of the original position can know the exact point at which discontinuity sets in, because the language we employ in comparing different outcomes is ineradicably vague. It is also argued that the account underlying (b) can help proponents of superiority in value theory defend their view against arguments offered by Norcross and Griffin.
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References found in this work BETA
John Rawls (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Harvard University Press.
Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
John Rawls (2009/2005). A Theory of Justice. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press 133-135.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Moehler (2015). The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute: A Moral Point of View. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
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