What is interpretation? A dilemma for Davidson

Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 40 (98):54-66 (2014)
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Abstract

The core idea of Davidson’s philosophy of language is that a theory of truth constructed as an empirical theory by a radical interpreter is a theory of meaning. I discuss an ambiguity that arises from Davidson's notion of interpretation: it can either be understood as the hypothetical process of constructing a theory of truth for a language or as a process that actually happens when speakers communicate. I argue that each disambiguation is problematic and does not result in a theory of meaning.

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Nils Kürbis
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

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Introduction.Donald Davidson - 1984 - In Truth and Predication. Harvard University Press. pp. 1-6.

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