Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):577 - 590 (2010)
|Abstract||The modal logic of Gödel sentences, termed as GS, is introduced to analyze the logical properties of 'true but unprovable' sentences in formal arithmetic. The logic GS is, in a sense, dual to Grzegorczyk's Logic, where modality can be interpreted as 'true and provable'. As we show, GS and Grzegorczyk's Logic are, in fact, mutually embeddable. We prove Kripke completeness and arithmetical completeness for GS. GS is also an extended system of the logic of 'Essence and Accident' proposed by Marcos (Bull Sect Log 34(1):43-56, 2005). We also clarify the relationships between GS and the provability logic GL and between GS and Intuitionistic Propositional Logic|
|Keywords||Modal logic Gödel incompleteness theorems|
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