Empirical Analyses of Causation

In Allan Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics. Palgrave Macmillan (2009)
Abstract
Conceptual analyses can be subdivided into two classes, good and evil. Em- pirical analysis is the good kind, routinely practiced in the sciences. Orthodox analysis is the malevolent version that plagues philosophical discourse. In this paper, I will clarify the difference between them, provide some reasons to prefer good over evil, and illustrate their consequences for the metaphysics of causation. By conducting an empirical analysis of causation rather than an orthodox analysis, one can segregate the genuine metaphysical problems that need to be addressed from the many pseudo-problems that have long dogged traditional accounts of causation.
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