Supervenience and reductionism

Erkenntnis 36 (3):333-343 (1992)
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to show that claims of supervenience of the mental upon the physical do not define substantial forms of materialism. While weak supervenience holds trivially, even strong supervenience does not justify a claim of identity, dependence or determination; it is only a relation between classifications of persons by psychological and physical properties
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Franz von Kutschera (1994). Global Supervenience and Belief. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1):103-110.
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