Kuhn on essentialism and the causal theory of reference

Philosophy of Science 77 (4):544-564 (2010)
Abstract
The causal theory of reference is often taken to provide a solution to the problems, such as incomparability and referential discontinuity, that the meaning-change thesis raised. I show that Kuhn successfully questioned the causal theory and Putnam's idea that reference is determined via the sameness relation of essences that holds between a sample and other members of a kind in all possible worlds. Putnam's single ‘essential' properties may be necessary but not sufficient to determine membership in a kind category. Kuhn argued that extension is fixed by similarity-dissimilarity relations that are liable to change in taxonomic reorganizations of science. *Received October 2009; revised January 2010. †To contact the author, please write to: Institute of Philosophy, University of Leiden, Martin de Vrieshof 4, 2300 RS Leiden, The Netherlands; e-mail: j.kuukkanen@phil.leidenuniv.nl
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Alex Stewart Davies (2013). Kuhn on Incommensurability and Theory Choice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (4):571-579.
    Similar books and articles
    Jarrett Leplin (1988). Is Essentialism Unscientific? Philosophy of Science 55 (4):493-510.
    Dunja Jutronić (2006). Is Reference Borrowing a Causal Process? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):41-49.
    Frank Hofmann (2001). The Reference of de Re Representations. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):83-101.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-10-03

    Total downloads

    36 ( #40,411 of 1,088,400 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,400 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.