Adams on actualism and presentism

Abstract According to the TDT, no singular propositions about an individual and no "thisnesses" of individuals exist prior to the existence of the indivi­dual in question, where a thisness "is the property of being x, or of being identical with x" and a "singular proposition about an individual x is a proposition that involves or refers to x directly, perhaps by having x or the thisness of x as a constituent, and not merely by way of x's qualitative properties or relations to other individuals" (p. 315) The support for this position comes from two sources, according to Adams.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,672
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Rafael De Clercq (2006). Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386-402.
    Ulrich Meyer (2005). The Presentist's Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 122 (3):213 - 225.
    Richard Swinburne (1995). Thisness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):389 – 400.
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). "Adams on Actualism and Presentism". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):289-298.
    Joseph Diekemper (2009). Thisness and Events. Journal of Philosophy 106 (5):255-276.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    26 ( #47,624 of 549,061 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #63,185 of 549,061 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums