Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):289-298 (1989)
|Abstract||According to the TDT, no singular propositions about an individual and no "thisnesses" of individuals exist prior to the existence of the individual in question, where a thisness "is the property of being x, or of being identical with x" and a "singular proposition about an individual x is a proposition that involves or refers to x directly, perhaps by having x or the thisness of x as a constituent, and not merely by way of x's qualitative properties or relations to other individuals" (p. 315) The support for this position comes from two sources, according to Adams.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Rafael De Clercq (2006). Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386-402.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). &Quot;adams on Actualism and Presentism&Quot;. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):289-298.
Christopher Menzel (1993). Singular Propositions and Modal Logic. Philosophical Topics 21 (2):113-148.
William L. Craig (1997). Adams on Actualism and Presentism. Philosophia 25 (1-4):401-405.
Robert Merrihew Adams (1981). Actualism and Thisness. Synthese 49 (1):3 - 41.
Robert Adams (1981). ``Actualism and Thisness&Quot. Synthese 57:3-42.
Christopher Menzel (1991). Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 5:475-507.
Richard Swinburne (1995). Thisness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):389 – 400.
Ulrich Meyer (2005). The Presentist's Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 122 (3):213 - 225.
Joseph Diekemper (2009). Thisness and Events. Journal of Philosophy 106 (5):255-276.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #49,760 of 722,698 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,006 of 722,698 )
How can I increase my downloads?