Can a coherence theory appeal to appearance states?
Philosophical Studies 67 (3):197-217 (1992)
| Abstract | Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of foundationalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states. | |||||||||
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