Coherentism and justified inconsistent beliefs: A solution

Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41 (2012)
The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00090.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

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Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011). Millar on the Value of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):83-99.

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