Counterfactuals: Ambiguities, true premises, and knowledge

Synthese 100 (1):133 - 164 (1994)
In this paper I explore the ambiguity that arises between two readings of the counterfactual construction, then–d and thel–p, analyzed in my bookA Theory of Counterfactuals. I then extend the analysis I offered there to counterfactuals with true antecedents, and offer a more precise formulation of the conception of temporal divergence points used in thel–p interpretation. Finally, I discuss some ramifications of these issues for counterfactual analyses of knowledge.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063923
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Lee Walters (2009). Morgenbesser's Coin and Counterfactuals with True Components. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):365-379.
Igal Kvart (1992). Counterfactuals. Erkenntnis 36 (2):139 - 179.

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