Philosophical Studies 134 (2):131-140 (2007)
|Abstract||Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure principle can be articulated that will survive scrutiny. Opponents of contextualism often try to gain an advantage over it by claiming that their view mimics these virtues of contextualism as well as having other virtues. A recent example of the same is termed ‘contrastivism," as presented by Jonathan Schaffer. I will argue that the representation made is chimerical, that in fact contrastivism has no hope of mirroring these twin virtues of contextualism.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Keith DeRose (2011). Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):81-110.
Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger (2004). Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):143 - 172.
Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Contrastivism and Closure. Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256.
Kelly Becker (2009). Contrastivism and Lucky Questions. Philosophia 37 (2):245-260.
Federico Luzzi (2011). Contextualism and Counter-Closure. Dialectica 66 (1):187-199.
Ernest Sosa (2004). Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):35-65.
Sarah Wright (2010). Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):95-114.
Elke Brendel (2005). Why Contextualists Cannot Know They Are Right: Self-Refuting Implications of Contextualism. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (2):38-55.
Jonathan Schaffer (2004). From Contextualism to Contrastivism. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
Jonathan Schaffer (2005). What Shifts? : Thresholds, Standards, or Alternatives? In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads78 ( #12,470 of 722,742 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,344 of 722,742 )
How can I increase my downloads?