Philosophy of Science 61 (1):96-114 (1994)
|Abstract||In Kvart (1991a), I discussed the analysis of causal relevance presented in A Theory of Counterfactuals (1986) (and first in 1975). I explained there in what respect the notion captured by the analysis of Kvart (1986) is a mere approximation to the requisite notion of causal relevance. In this paper I present another analysis of causal relevance, devoid of the shortcoming of its predecessor. The present analysis of causal relevance is, again, grounded in a chancelike notion of objective probability. The correlative notion of causal independence is analyzed as holding in case there is a so-called causal impact series, which is defined here. The basic notions used for this analysis are the notion of a differentiator, which upsets an equiprobability case, and that of a blocker, which restores it|
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