American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):189 - 198 (1986)
|Abstract||In recent years, epistemologists have become increasingly impressed with reliabilist theories of justification. 1 Reliabilism is often formulated as the claim that a belief is justified 2 just in case it is a reliable belief; however, this formulation can be somewhat misleading. There is a sense in which a set of beliefs can be reliable, just as a certain history or testimony can be reliable: what one means is that a certain set of propositions is highly accurate, has mostly true members, or is not wrong in any important way. Reliabilists, though, do not just want to say that a belief is justified just in case it is a member of a type with mostly true members, i.e., just in case it is probably true; they also want to appeal to the notion of reliability in that sense in which we say that persons, processes, procedures, tests, and experiments are reliable. Reliabilism is a view both about the reliability of beliefs and about the reliability of the person who has the belief or the procedure that is responsible for the belief.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Joachim Horvath (2009). Why the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem Fails. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):115-120.
Jack Lyons (2013). Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
Michael A. Bishop (forthcoming). Why the Generality Problem is Everybody's Problem. Philosophical Studies.
Jarrett Leplin (2007). In Defense of Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):31 - 42.
Juan Comesaña (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27 - 47.
Marshall Swain (1985). Justification, Reasons, and Reliability. Synthese 64 (1):69 - 92.
Catherine Z. Elgin (2008). Trustworthiness. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):371-387.
Jonathan Weisberg (2010). Bootstrapping in General*†. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads5 ( #160,483 of 549,518 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,518 )
How can I increase my downloads?