Lewis's 'causation as influence'

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):409 – 421 (2001)
Abstract
In his ‘Causation as Influence’,1 David Lewis proposed a counterfactual theory of cause which was designed to improve on his previous account.2 Here I offer counter-examples to this new account, involving early preemption and late preemption, and a revised account, which is no longer an influence theory, that handles those counter-examples.
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