Millar on the Value of Knowledge

Abstract
Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
Peter D. Klein (2008). Useful False Beliefs. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 25--63.

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Alan Millar (2011). Why Knowledge Matters. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
ByAlan Millar (2005). Travis' Sense of Occasion. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):337–342.
Alan Millar (forthcoming). ``Why Knowledge Matters&Quot. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
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