Omniscience and eternity: A reply to Craig Jonathan L. Kvanvig
|Abstract||Craig claims that my treatment of temporal indexicals such as ‘now’ is inadequate, and that my theory gives no general account of tense. Craig’s argument misunderstands the theory of indexicals I give, and I show how to extend the theory to give a general account of tense.|
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