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Analysis 47 (3):162 - 167 (1987)
LEMKE has recently taken issue (see ANALYSIS 46.3, June 1986, pp. 138-44) with my claim that no counterfactual causal account of the basing relation is plausible (see ANALYSIS 45.3, June 1985, pp. 153-8). Intuitively, a counterfactual causal account claims that belief is based on evidence if and only if the evidence either causes the belief or would have caused it had the actual cause been absent. This intuitive formulation accounts only for counterfactual causes of level one: events which would have been a cause had only the actual cause been absent. As I argued, there is as much support for allowing counterfactual causes having a higher cardinality: events which would have been a cause had the actual cause and some other counterfactual causes been absent.
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