David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press (2009)
The knowability paradox derives from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963. The proof purportedly shows that if all truths are knowable, it follows that all truths are known. Antirealists, wed as they are to the idea that truth is epistemic, feel threatened by the proof. For what better way to express the epistemic character of truth than to insist that all truths are knowable? Yet, if that insistence logically compels similar assent to some omniscience claim, antirealism is in jeopardy. Response to the paradox has drifted toward a common theme, a theme I will argue is a non-starter in resolving the paradox. Seeing this point will also make clear the philosophical inadequacy of simply viewing the paradox as a refutation of a wide range of antirealisms.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Christopher Gregory Weaver (2013). A Church-Fitch Proof for the Universality of Causation. Synthese 190 (14):2749-2772.
Martin Fischer (2013). Some Remarks on Restricting the Knowability Principle. Synthese 190 (1):63-88.
Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu (2013). Discovering Knowability: A Semantic Analysis. Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
Similar books and articles
Cesare Cozzo (1994). What Can We Learn From the Paradox of Knowability? Topoi 13 (2):71--78.
Jonathan Kvanvig (1999). Tennant on Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422-428.
M. Hand (2003). Knowability and Epistemic Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.
Peter Marton (2006). Verificationists Versus Realists: The Battle Over Knowability. Synthese 151 (1):81 - 98.
Greg Restall (2009). Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at Least, Not All at Once). In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. 339--354.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Lessons in False Hope&Quot. In Joseph Salerno (ed.), New Essays on Knowability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 205-222.
Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2008). Knowability, Possibility and Paradox. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
Salvatore Florio & Julien Murzi (2009). The Paradox of Idealization. Analysis 69 (3):461-469.
Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno, Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #49,032 of 1,088,427 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,427 )
How can I increase my downloads?